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Abstract. We propose a definition of physical objects that aims
to clarify some interpretational problems in quantum mechanics.
We claim that the transformations induced by an objective prop-
erty of a physical system must leave invariant all the other objec-
tive properties of the same system. The uncertainty principle is
understood as a natural consequence of the imbrication between
objective properties and non-objective properties. It follows from
the proposed definition that in classical mechanics non-objective
properties are wrongly considered objective. We conclude that, un-
like classical mechanics, quantum mechanics provides a complete
objective description of physical systems.
I. Introduction
According to Einstein, quantum mechanical description of physical
reality cannot be considered complete. In his words, there are ‘ele-
ments of physical reality’ that do not ‘have a counterpart in the phys-
ical theory’.1 In classical mechanics, the exact position and the exact
momentum of a particle can be simultaneously predicted for all times
from a given set of initial conditions. In quantum mechanics, on the
other hand, the momentum of a system characterized by a well-defined
position cannot be predicted by the theory (and vice versa). More gen-
erally, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that canonically con-
jugated variables can be simultaneously predicted up to some inversely
1This is the conclusion of the seminal Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen article (Einstein
et al. [1935]). An historical account can be found in (Mittelsteadt [2006]).
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correlated uncertainties. The conceptual content of this principle has
been the object of a heated debate that remains unresolved to this day.2
In this paper, we argue that quantum mechanics can be understood
as the formalization of a rigorous definition of physical objects. Ac-
cording to the standard characterization, the objective properties that
define a physical object are invariants under a certain set of trans-
formations (Auyang [1995]; Born [1998]; Nozick [1998]; Weyl [1952]).
However, there is no general prescription for determining which trans-
formations are needed in order to define the objective properties of a
given physical system. Our definition of physical objects claims that
these transformations are induced by the objective properties them-
selves. In other words, we argue that the transformations induced by
the objective properties of a physical system must be automorphisms of
the system. This definition imposes a compatibility condition on the set
of objective properties of a given object. This condition requires that
an objective property be invariant under the transformations induced
by the other objective properties of the same object. The significant re-
sult is that this compatibility condition is not consistent with classical
mechanics, but rather with quantum mechanics.
According to our definition of physical objects, the uncertainty prin-
ciple is the formal translation of the imbrication between objective
properties and non-objective properties. As we shall see, asking which
position is objective in a quantum system with a well-defined momen-
tum is as nonsensical as asking which side of a die is the objective (or
privileged) one. This means that in classical mechanics non-objective
elements of physical reality are wrongly considered objective. On the
other hand, we claim that quantum mechanics provides a complete de-
scription of all the objective properties of a physical object. It follows
that the quantum description of a physical object is not incomplete,
2Many interpretations were proposed for the uncertainty principle. It was alter-
natively interpreted as a consequence of the unpredictable perturbations in experi-
mental measures of physical quantities, as a result of the mutual incompatibility of
certain experimental contexts, in terms of a subjective lack of knowledge of well-
defined objective states, as a description of the statistical spread in an ensemble of
similarly prepared systems, as the manifestation of an ontological indeterminate-
ness in the definition of physical quantities, etc. (see for example Hilgevoord and
Uffink [2006]).
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but rather that classical states are specified by means of too many vari-
ables. Since quantum states only describe all the objective properties
of the object, they depend on half of the classical variables.
This article develops, in more conceptual terms, the interpretation
of quantum mechanics begun in Catren [2008]. This interpretation
is founded on an analysis of the symplectic formulation of mechanics
(Abraham and Marsden [1978]; Libermann and Marle [1987]; Marsden
and Ratiu [1999]; Souriau [1997]) and the geometric quantization for-
malism (Brylinski [1993]; Kostant [1970]; Souriau [1997]; Woodhouse
[1992]). In Section II, we propose a definition of physical objects. In
Section III, we consider the dynamics of physical objects. In the last
Section we summarize the obtained results. Finally, in the appendix
we give a brief description of the relevant mathematical structures from
symplectic geometry.
II. Phases of an elephant
In this section, we propose a definition of physical objects by means
of two postulates. It is possible to show that these postulates cannot be
implemented in the framework of classical mechanics (see appendix and
Catren [2008]). On the contrary, quantum mechanics can be considered
a satisfactory implementation of the proposed definition of physical
objects.
Physical experience is not a chaotic swarm of disconnected empiri-
cal data. As Whitehead put it: ‘Sometimes we see an elephant, and
sometimes we do not’ (Whitehead [1978], p. 4). In other words, physi-
cal reality is organized in different objective configurations that can be
identified and recognized. According to a standard characterization, an
object is a physical configuration that can be completely characterized
by specifying the set of the object’s objective properties. Such a set
will be called the eidos ε of the physical object.3 In order to unpack
this characterization, it is necessary to specify what we understand by
objective properties. As we shall see, the characterization of objective
properties as invariants under a certain set of transformations does
not suffice for defining the notion of objective properties. In order to
achieve a satisfactory definition of physical objects, it is necessary to
take into account that a physical objet does not only have objective
3
4 GABRIEL CATREN
properties that allow us to identify and recognize it: it also has different
phases, aspects or profiles. In general, various kinds of transformations
can be performed in order to observe the different phases of an object.
For instance, there are objects that exhibit different phases when ro-
tated around a given axis. The transformations that interchange the
phases of an object will be called phase transformations of the object.
A set of phases connected by means of a given one-parameter family
of phase transformations will be called orbit of phases. For instance,
the different phases observed when the object is rotated around a given
axis belong to the same orbit of phases. Since a phase transformation
only modifies the observed phase, the objective properties that de-
fine the object are necessarily invariant under phase transformations.
In order to stress this fact, phase transformations will also be called
automorphisms of the object. In this way, we recover the idea that
an object can be defined by means of the invariants under a certain
group of transformations (see for example Auyang [1995]; Born [1998];
Nozick [1998]). Following H. Weyl, we can thus state that ‘[...] objec-
tivity means invariance with respect to the group of automorphisms’
(Weyl [1952]). Nevertheless this standard characterization is insuffi-
cient for defining objectivity. This problem was clearly stated by R.
Nozick [1998]: ‘The notion of invariance under transformations cannot
(without further supplementation) be a complete criterion of the ob-
jectivity of facts, for its application depends upon a selection of which
transformations something is to be invariant under.’4 The definition
of physical objects that we will propose provides this ‘further supple-
mentation’ by stating that the object’s automorphisms are induced by
the objective properties of the object. Hence, not only is an objective
property invariant under all the object’s automorphisms, but it also
induces a one-parameter family of automorphisms.
In order to formalize this idea, we will propose a definition of physi-
cal objects by means of two fundamental postulates. To do so, we will
introduce some terminology. We will say that a physical object realizes
a certain number of universal operators in a way that depends on the
objet. For example, an object that can be rotated around the z-axis
realizes (in a particular way that depends on the objet) the universal
4Analogously, H. Weyl continues the preceding quotation as follows: ‘Reality
may not always give a clear answer to the question what the actual group of auto-
morphisms is [...]’ (Weyl [1952]).
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operator that generates universal rotations around the z-axis. We will
sometimes say that a universal operator makes ingression into the ob-
ject in a way that depends on the objet. The important point is that
two different objects can realize different universal operators or realize
differently the same universal operator. Hence, an object can be char-
acterized by the way in which it realizes a particular set of universal
operators. Therefore, there are two ways of characterizing an object,
namely by means of its objective properties or by specifying how it
realizes certain universal operators. Our first postulate unifies these
two ways of characterizing an object:
Postulate ♠: the value of an objective property of a given object
specifies the particular way in which the object realizes a universal
operator.
The ingression of a universal operator into an object defines what we
will call an eigenoperator of the object. For example, there are objects
defined (at least partially) by the objective property that specifies how
the universal operator that generates universal rotations around the
z-axis makes ingression into the object. This ingression defines an
eigenoperator that generates the object’s rotations around the z-axis.
In this way, postulate ♠ states that the particular value p0 that an
objective property p takes on a given object O defines an ingression
application ιp0 of the form:
ιp0 : universal operator ξp → eigenoperator vˆp (1)
Each possible value of the objective property p defines a different
ingression of the same universal operator ξp, that is to say a different
eigenoperator vˆp of O.
The second postulate of our definition of physical objects specifies the
nature of the transformations generated by the object’s eigenoperators:
Postulate ♣: the transformations generated by an object’s eigen-
operator are phase transformations.
In other words, a transformation generated by one of the object’s
eigenoperators is not an objective transformation of the object into
another object. In the previous example, this means that the object’s
rotation around the z-axis is not an objective transformation of the
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object, but rather an automorphism that leaves the objective prop-
erties invariant. These two postulates can be assembled together by
stating that an objective property specifies how a universal operator
is realized by the object in the form of an eigenoperator that gener-
ates automorphisms of the object. We will sometimes summarize this
characterization by saying that an objective property induces a one-
parameter family of automorphisms. In this way, the object’s eidos (i.e.
the set of its objective properties) defines the identity of the object by
inducing the phase transformations between its different phases. We
can therefore propose the following definition:
Definition: An object is a physical configuration that can be com-
pletely characterized by specifying the values of the objective properties
that induce all the object’s automorphisms.
We could say that this definition provides a rigorous formalization
of Weyl’s prescription: ‘Whenever you have to do with a structure-
endowed entity Σ try to determine its group of automorphisms, the
group of those element-wise transformations which leave all structural
relations undisturbed. You can expect to gain a deep insight into the
constitution of Σ in this way.’ (Weyl [1952]). In the case of the pro-
posed definition of physical objects, the objective properties that define
the object do induce the object’s automorphisms.
One significant consequence of this definition is that the phase trans-
formations induced by an objective property in the object’s eidos can-
not modify the other objective properties of the object. Objective prop-
erties must therefore be invariant under phase transformations induced
by the other objective properties of the same object. Let’s consider for
example an object defined by the eidos ε = {p1, p2, ..., pn}, where each
pi is an objective property of the object. This means that it is possi-
ble to completely characterize the object by the set of values that the
properties p1, p2, ..., pn take on the object. The standard definition of
objectivity requires that the value of each objective property pi be in-
variant under a certain group of transformations. Nevertheless – as we
have said before – it is not clearly stated which transformations have
to be considered. Our definition bypasses this flaw by stating that each
objective property pi induces a one-parameter family of automorphisms
of the object. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion that each objective
property has to be invariant under the automorphisms induced by all
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the other properties in the same eidos. This fact imposes a restrictive
condition on the eidos of an object. The eidos is not merely a collection
of unrelated objective properties. Each property has to satisfy the con-
dition of being invariant under the phase transformations induced by
all the others. If a property p1 is invariant under the phase transforma-
tions induced by p2, we will say that the properties are commensurable
or compatible. If a property is modified by the phase transformations
induced by an objective property in the object’s eidos, we will say that
the former is phased out by these phase transformations. Therefore,
the eidos is characterized by an internal structure that guarantees the
compatibility between the objective properties that define the object.5
The object will be completely determined if the eidos contains the
maximum number of mutually compatible properties. In particular, if
a property q is modified by the phase transformations induced by an
objective property p in the object’s eidos, then q cannot also be an
objective property of the object. This statement can be considered the
conceptual translation of the uncertainty principle. In particular, the
momentum p is a property that induces transformations in the position
q (and vice versa).6 Hence, if the momentum p is an objective property
in the object’s eidos, then the position q cannot also be an objective
property. The position q is rather a phase that changes when the ob-
ject is acted upon by the phase transformations induced by p. In other
words, since q and p are incompatible, they cannot both be objective
properties of the same object. Asking which position is objective in an
object with a well-defined momentum p is as nonsensical as looking for
the objective (or privileged) side of a die. Nevertheless, even if a die
has no objective side, it will show a particular side when thrown. This
does not mean that the resulting side was the objective but unknown
side of the die, nor that it becomes the objective side of a new die
produced by the toss. Analogously, even if a physical system with a
well-defined momentum p has no objective position q, it will appear in
a particular position q1 if a measurement of the position is performed.
5In technical terms, the action induced by a property g on a property f is given
by the Poisson bracket δgf = {f, g}. The requirement of internal consistency of
the eidos ε imposes the condition {f, g} = 0, ∀f, g ∈ ε. In other words, the eidos is
a commutative Poisson algebra.
6The Poisson bracket {q, p} = 1 means that the momentum p is the generator of
the infinitesimal canonical transformations of the position q (and vice versa).
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Fig. 1
This does not mean that q1 was the objective but unknown position of
the system, nor that q1 becomes the objective position of a new object
produced by the measurement.
Figure 1 resumes the proposed definition of physical objects. The
property p is an objective property of the object represented. The
value p0 of this property specifies how the universal operator ξp makes
ingression into the object. The ingression of the universal operator
ξp defines the eigenoperator vˆp. This eigenoperator generates phase
transformations that act upon the property q. Hence, the different
values of this property are just different phases in the orbit of phases
generated by the eigenoperator vˆp.
According to postulate ♣, the transformations induced by the ob-
jective properties of an object are phase transformations. As we have
shown, the uncertainty principle is a formal consequence of this pos-
tulate. If the momentum p is an objective property of an object, then
the position q is completely phased out by the phase transformations
induced by p. Since the classical definition of objective physical states
comprises both the exact position and the exact momentum of the sys-
tem, this postulate cannot be consistently implemented in the frame-
work of classical mechanics. We can also argue differently. If both
the position and the momentum were included in the object’s eidos,
then both the position and the momentum would be phased out by
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the phase transformations induced by the momentum and the position
respectively. Therefore, both the position and the momentum would
only be non-objective phases, and the physical system would have no
objective properties at all. We can thus conclude that the classical
definition of states by means of both q and p is incompatible with our
definition of physical objects. The classical definition of a physical
state is consistent only if we deny that the transformations induced
by an objective property of the system are phase transformations. In
fact, in classical mechanics the transformations induced by an objec-
tive property are not interpreted as phase transformations, but rather
as transformations between states that are objectively different. For
example, the transformations induced by the Hamiltonian are inter-
preted as temporal evolutions between different objective states. In
this way, the definition of classical states becomes consistent. Never-
theless, objective properties can no longer be defined as quantities that
induce the object’s automorphisms. Hence, the classical definition of
both objective properties and physical objects remains problematic.
The situation has thus been conveniently reversed: the problem is no
longer how to recover objectivity in quantum mechanics, but rather
how to define classical objects in a consistent manner.
For the sake of simplicity we have only considered the case of an
object with a well-defined momentum and a completely undetermined
position. The reciprocal case – a well-defined position with an unde-
termined momentum – is completely analogous. In the general case,
both the position and the momentum are subject to certain indetermi-
nacies. In fact, the flexibility of quantum mechanics’ formalism makes
it possible to define physical objects characterized by properties which
are neither objective properties nor phases, but rather a mixture of
both. In these cases, neither q nor p are sharp objective properties
of the object. For example, if q is an unsharp objective property of
an object, then the induced phase transformations are unsharp phase
transformations. Therefore, the conjugated momentum p is phased out
only partially. Hence, p is in turn an unsharp objective property that
partially phases out the coordinate q. Therefore, q cannot be a sharp
objective property (as it was assumed at the beginning) and the circle
closes consistently. This means that a certain property can be partially
considered an unsharp objective property of the object and partially a
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phase. It follows that the mere distinction between objective proper-
ties and phases does not suffice for treating generic cases. The resulting
subtle equilibrium between unsharp objective properties and unsharp
non-objective phases is formally governed by the uncertainty principle.
III. The revenge of Zeno
“[...] comment l’objet qui se meut serait-il en un point
de son trajet ?”
H. Bergson, La pense´e et le mouvant (Bergson [1938,
p. 158])
The analysis presented in the previous section makes no reference to
temporal processes. Since physics, as it is usually understood, studies
the temporal evolution of physical systems, we will now introduce a
temporal parameter t. The consideration of temporal processes allows
to shift the discussion from momenta pi (observables that generate
infinitesimal canonical transformations of positions qi) to velocities q˙i
(infinitesimal temporal variations of qi).
We will begin by noting that an object O characterized by a well-
defined velocity lacks, by definition, a well-defined position. Analo-
gously, a nomad is a person characterized by the property of not hav-
ing a well-defined position. We claim that this trivial fact contains the
conceptual kernel of the uncertainty principle for positions and veloc-
ities. One might argue that this lack of a well-defined position can
be bypassed by decomposing the movement in instantaneous objects
Ot that evolve in time, that is to say that change objectively as time
passes. Even though the state of motion of the object O makes it
impossible to assign it a constant position, it might still be possible
to define the objective positions of the different instantaneous objects
Ot. According to the standard terminology, the objects Ot might be
called the instantaneous states of the object O. We will now analyze
whether this strategy can be consistently pursued in the framework of
our definition of physical objects.
In what follows, we will restrict the analysis to the simplest case.
Let’s consider an object O consisting of a free particle moving with
a constant momentum p (or a constant velocity q˙). In principle, we
could decompose O in a sequence of instantaneous objects Ot. Each of
GABRIEL CATREN 11
these instantaneous objects Ot would be characterized by the objective
property p (which induces the displacements in q) and its position q(t)
at t. In other words, as in classical mechanics, both p and q(t) would
be objective properties of the instantaneous object Ot. Even if q(t) is
not an objective property of O, it might still be considered an objective
property of the instantaneous object Ot. Nevertheless, this decomposi-
tion of O in instantaneous objects Ot characterized by both p and q(t)
is inconsistent with the proposed definition of physical objects. Since
the position q(t) changes in time, the different instantaneous objects
Ot are objectively different. This results from the fact that the position
q(t) is considered an objective property of Ot. Hence, the different
instantaneous objects Ot differ in the objective property q(t). This
means that temporal evolution is a non trivial objective modification
of the instantaneous objects Ot. Therefore, the Hamiltonian h, which
induces the transformations of t, cannot be an objective property of
the instantaneous object Ot. According to our definition of physical
objects, if h were an objective property of Ot, then the transformations
induced by h would be phase transformations that could not objectively
modify the object. Since temporal evolution objectively modifies the
instantaneous objects Ot, the Hamiltonian h cannot be an objective
property of Ot. Nevertheless, this conclusion contradicts the fact that
if p is an objective property of Ot, then h =
p
2m
should also be an ob-
jective property of Ot. We can also argue in the opposite sense. Since
p is an objective property of Ot, the Hamiltonian h =
p
2m
is also an
objective property of Ot. Hence, according to our definition of physical
objects, the transformations induced by h are phase transformations.7
Therefore, the different Ot are not different instantaneous objects Ot,
but rather different phases of the same object O. We can thus con-
clude that the object O cannot be consistently decomposed in different
instantaneous objects Ot. Hence, the object O is an indecomposable
object with different non-objective temporal phases. In other words,
what we observe at different times are not different instantaneous ob-
jects Ot, but rather different non-objective temporal phases of the same
object O.
7This statement is a rigorous interpretation of the fact that ‘[...] the motion
of a mechanical system corresponds to the continuous evolution or unfolding of a
canonical transformation.’ (Goldstein [1981]).
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These considerations do not mean that it is impossible to define
physical objects that change objectively in time. We simply claim that
a system moving with a constant velocity cannot be analyzed in terms
of instantaneous objects (or objective states) that change objectively
in time. However, in principle, it is possible to define an instantaneous
object Ot such that its eidos contains the property t.
8 Since the time
t is an objective property of the instantaneous object Ot, the property
h is phased out by the phase transformations induced by t. Hence, the
transformations induced by h are no longer phase transformations, but
rather objective transformations of the object. Therefore, at different
times t and t′, there are instantaneous objects Ot and Ot′ that are
objectively different.9
IV. Conclusion
We have defined a physical object as a set of mutually compati-
ble objective properties such that each objective property induces a
one-parameter family of automorphisms. The compatibility condition
guarantees that the objective properties are invariant under the auto-
morphisms induced by all the other objective properties of the same
object. The uncertainty principle is a direct consequence of the mutual
imbrication between objective properties and non-objective phases: if p
is a sharp objective property of an object, then the property q (phased
out by the phase transformations induced by p) cannot also be an ob-
jective property.
We could restate Einstein’s requirement by saying that a satisfac-
tory physical theory has to provide a complete objective description
of physical reality (Einstein et al. [1935]). Firstly, this means that
every objective property of physical reality should have a counterpart
in the theory. Secondly, non-objective properties should not be mis-
taken for objective properties by the theory. The classical descrip-
tion of a physical system includes both its objective properties and its
8We are supposing that it is possible to treat time and the Hamiltonian as another
pair of conjugated canonical variables. In fact, this is possible in the framework of
the so-called parameterized systems (see for example Lanczos [1986] and Castagnino
et al. [2002]).
9The arguments presented in this section suggest that a satisfactory compre-
hension of the uncertainty principle for time and energy might be an essential
component of a consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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non-objective phases. Unlike classical mechanics, quantum mechanics
provides a complete objective description of physical systems.
V. Appendix
We will now give a brief account of the formal structures that un-
derlie the proposed definition of physical objects (for more details see
Abraham and Marsden [1978]; Catren [2008]; Libermann and Marle
[1987]; Marsden and Ratiu [1999]). A symplectic action of a Lie group
G (of Lie algebra g) on a symplectic manifold (M,ω) is a group action
Φ : G×M →M that preserves the symplectic form ω, i.e. that satisfies
Φ∗gω = ω, where Φ
∗
g is the pullback defined by the map Φg(·)
.
= Φ(g, ·).
Such an action defines a map ι : g→ TM (that we have called ingres-
sion) between Lie algebra elements ξ ∈ g (that we have called universal
operators) and fundamental vector fields vξ on M (that we have called
realized operators). The fundamental vector field vξ is given by the
expression
vξ(x) =
d
dλ
(exp(−λξ) · x)|λ=0,
where x ∈M and ξ ∈ g. The symplectic action is said to be Hamilton-
ian if the ingression map ι : g → TM can be “factorized” as follows
g
µ˜
//
ι
%%
C∞(M)
pi
// TM, (2)
where µ˜ : g → C∞(M) is the so-called co-momentum map and pi :
C∞(M)→ TM is the map between classical observables on M and the
so-called Hamiltonian vector fields. A classical observable f ∈ C∞(M)
defines a Hamiltonian vector field vf by means of the expression ivfω =
df , where ivfω denotes the contraction of vf with the symplectic 2-form
ω. The Hamiltonian vector field vf is the generator of the symplectic
diffeomorphisms φfλ : M →M , that is to say of the canonical transfor-
mations induced by the observable f . In R2, the Hamiltonian vector
field associated to an observable f ∈ C∞(M) is given by the expression
vf =
∂f
∂p
∂
∂q
−
∂f
∂q
∂
∂p
.
In other words, a symplectic action is Hamiltonian if the fundamen-
tal vector field vξ that realizes on M the universal operator ξ ∈ g can
also be obtained as the Hamiltonian vector field vf associated to a
physical observable f . It might seem that we have all the elements for
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implementing the proposed definition of physical objects. In fact, the
sequence of maps (2) seems to be the formal implementation of the
application (1) between universal operators and eigenoperators. Ac-
cording to (2), the objective properties f ∈ C∞(M) “factorize” the
ingression on M of universal operators ξ ∈ g. Nevertheless, the two
postulates that we used for defining physical objects are not satisfied in
the classical framework. The main problem is that the homomorphism
pi between the Poisson algebra of classical observables f ∈ C∞(M) and
the Lie algebra of classical operators vf (under the Lie bracket of vector
fields) is not an isomorphism of Lie algebras. This is a consequence of
the fact that the map f 7→ vf is not injective (since vk = 0 for any
k ∈ R). The fundamental consequence of this non-injectivity is that
Lievpvq = [vq, vp] = v{q,p} = v1 = 0, even if Lievpq = {q, p} = 1. This
means that in classical mechanics, a non-trivial transformation (gener-
ated by the classical operator vp) of the value of an objective property
q does not necessarily modify the realized operator vq. This means
that in classical mechanics, different states (characterized by different
values of q) do not realize differently the same universal operator in g.
Hence, an objective property cannot be defined – as we did in postu-
late ♠ – as a quantity that specifies the particular way in which the
object realizes a universal operator. As for postulate ♣ (according to
which a realized operator generates automorphisms of the object), we
have already shown why it cannot be consistently implemented in clas-
sical mechanics. In order to satisfy these postulates, it is necessary to
extend the classical operators vf to quantum operators vˆf such that
the latter satisfy Dirac’s quantization conditions. In the framework
of geometric quantization, this can be done by means of the so-called
prequantization formalism (Brylinski [1993]; Kostant [1970]; Souriau
[1997]; Woodhouse [1992]).
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